股权激励,公司治理与现金股利政策(硕士)(论文42000字)
摘 要
委托代理问题是现代企业治理的核心问题。股权激励是解决该问题的重要手段之一，欧美成熟资本市场中上市公司通过实施股权激励将所有者与管理层目标统一取得了很好效果。随着我国资本市场的发展和成熟，在政府监管层鼓励下和上市公司内部治理需求推动下，上市公司实施股权激励的数量逐年增加，为我国资本市场的发展与完善提供了强有力的支撑。但深入研究近年来，在我们国家的上市公司对股权这个方面做出的激励方案的案例，我们可以知道，不管是怎样设计股权、还是关注在股权政策制定出来的时候的目的、甚至是在股权激励政策实行的过程中，都会存在一些大大小小的问题，在这过程中，也出现了许许多多的表面上为了股权激励实为向管理层利益输送的案例，上述问题已经引起学术界关注。学者们通过对这些上市公司进行研究发现，一些股权激励计划在实施后并没有使所有者与管理者的利益达成一致，反而加剧了代理问题，最终沦为了管理者为自身谋取利益的工具。也就是说，公司实施股权激励计划会影响公司的财务决策。现金股利政策作为三大财务决策之一，利润分配决策的一部分，也会受到股权激励计划的影响。股利代理成本理论很好地解释了成熟市场公司向员工发放现金股利的真实的原因。我们可以从治理公司的角度来思考这些问题，现金股利的作用非常大的，现金股利可以很好地处理小股东代理和大股东之间发生的问题，也可以很好地处理管理阶层跟公司股东之间的矛盾，对公司的治理发挥着极其重要的作用。虽然上市公司的股东大会、董事会拥有股利分配的权力，但事实上，管理层在一定程度上也会对股利分配产生影响。特别是在我国两职兼任，即董事会成员兼管理人员的情况普遍存。这导致上市公司股权激励的激励对象同时又是股权激励方案的制定者。在这样的背景下，股权激励的直接受益人，即管理层是否会为了获得最大的股权收益而制定相应的现金股利政策？实施股权激励是每个上市公司个体的行为，不同的上市公司的不同特征也会对股权激励、现金股利政策产生不同的影响。从公司治理的角度（本文主要指管理层权力的大小）来看，在实施股权激励方案的公司中，管理层权力是否会进一步影响现金股利政策？
本文的研究过程主要包括：首先，我们对有关本文研究的参考资料做了详细的整理。在全面的了解之后我们可以知道，第一，可以很好地理清楚股权激励、公司的治理方案、还有就是现金股利政策的基本概念；第二，关于股权激励，笔者整理了管理层激励的基本理论做了介绍、全面的分析激励的必要性质，而且还全面的总结了现在的公司里所采用的股权激励对股利政策所产生影响的相关记载；第三，关于现金股利政策，笔者从代理理论和非代理理论两个角度整理了相关文献；第四、关于公司治理，笔者以管理层权力为切入点，梳理相关文献，明确了管理层权力对于公司治理的重要影响。其次，笔者进行了假设推导和实证分析。本文以2011-2013年上市公司数据为样本，结合委托代理理论、企业理论、信息不对称等理论，采用定量和定性的相关的研究的方法，我们还可以从治理公司的角度，全面的研究和分析公司在实施股权激励方案的时候，对实施的现金股利政策会产生什么样的影响，剖析了在股权激励的背景下，公司实施的股利分配政策的真正动机。最后，笔者对全文进行了总结。第一、整理并概括了本文的研究结论；第二、根据研究结论，有针对性的提出了建议，希望以此为企业、监管部门下一步实施股权激励计划、完善股权激励制度提供积极参考；第三、指明了文本研究的不足之处，为笔者后续研究明确了方向。
本文的研究结论是：第一，本文考察了股权激励制度实施了以后会对公司的财务行为产生的相关的影响，经过讨论之后我们知道，股权激励是影响我们国家上市以后的公司股权政策的重要的影响因素之一。第二，管理层权力的大小是影响公司支付现金股利的重要因素。在实施股权激励的上市公司中，相比于管理层权力被严格约束的上市公司，管理层权力未被约束的上市公司更倾向支付现金股利。
关键词：股权激励；现金股利政策；公司治理；管理层权力
ABSTRACT
Principal-agent is the core problem in the governance of modern enterprises. Stock ownership incentive is one of the important solutions. In Europe and America mature capital market, listed companies have gained good effect by unifying targets of owners and management layer through stock ownership incentive. Along with the development and maturity, the encouragement of government regulation layer and the promotion of listed company internal governance demand, stock ownership incentive has been implemented by more and more listed companies year after year, which provides a powerful support for the development and perfection of domestic capital market. However, through deep research on stock ownership incentive cases of China’s listed companies, it finds that some problems exist in its issuing motivation, design and implementation process. There are also many cases about delivering benefit to management layers under the name of stock ownership incentive. The above problems have draw attention of academic circles. After research on these listed companies, scholars find that some stock ownership incentive plan, after its implementation, does not reach an agreement on the benefit between owners and administrators, but aggravate agency problem. The stock ownership incentive finally becomes a tool to seek benefit for administrators themselves. That is to say, stock ownership incentive will influence company’s financial decision-making. Cash dividends policy, one of three financial policies and a part of profit distribution decision, will also be influenced by stock ownership incentive. Agency cost theory of dividend well explains the reason why companies in mature market distribute cashing dividend stably. From company governance perspective, cash dividends will relieve agency conflicts between shareholders and management layers, as well as between strong holders and minority holders. Although the dividend distribution power is owned by general meeting of stockholders and board of directors in listed companies, management layer influence the distribution of dividends to some extent actually. Especially in China, one person with dual positions, board member hold a concurrent post of administrator, commonly happens here. This results in a situation that, the incentive object of stock ownership incentive is at the same time the maker of stock ownership incentive plan. Under this background, will management layer, the direct beneficiaries of stock ownership incentive, make relevant cash dividends policy to obtain largest return on equity? The implementation of stock ownership incentive is individual behavior of each listed company. Different characteristics of different listed companies will have different influence on stock ownership incentive and cash dividends policy. From company governance perspective (mainly refer to power of management layer in this paper), will the power of management layer further influence cash dividend policy during the implementation of stock ownership incentive plan?
The research process of this paper include: to begin with, the author teases relevant literatures. Firstly, the author clarifies the concepts of company governance, stock ownership incentive and cash dividend policy. Secondly, as to dividend incentive, the author clears up theory basic of management layer incentive, analyzes the necessity of incentive, and summarizes existing literatures about the influence of stock ownership incentive on dividend policy. Thirdly, as to cash dividend policy, this paper clears up relevant literatures from agency theory and non-agency theory. Fourthly, as to company governance, with the entry point of management layer, the author teases relevant literatures, and makes clear the important influence of management layer power on corporate governance. Fifthly, the author deduces the hypothesis and makes empirical analysis. This paper regards data of listed company from 2011 to 2013 as the sample, and combines principal-agent theory, enterprise theory and information asymmetry theory. With quantitative and qualitative research method, this paper studies the influence of stock incentive plan on cash dividend policy, analyzes companies real motivation to implement dividend distribution policy from company governance level. Finally, the author makes a conclusion. The first is to tease and summarize research conclusion of this paper. The second is to put forward targeted advices upon research conclusion, and provides positive reference for further implementation of stock incentive plan of enterprises and supervision departments. The third is to point out the deficiency of this paper, and specify the direction for follow-up study.
The research conclusion of this paper is: firstly, this paper investigates the influence of stock incentive system on financial behavior, and finds that it is one of important factors which may influence dividend policy of listed companies. Some company management layers who implement stock incentive plan seek their own benefit by using of dividend policy. Secondly, the power of management layer is an important factor which may influence company to pay cash dividends. In listed companies who implement stock incentive, compared with those whose management layers are restrained, listed companies whose management layer without being restrained are more likely to pay cash dividends.
Key Words: equity incentive；cash dividend policy；corporate governance; managerial power
目 录
第一章 绪论 1
第一节 研究背景和意义 1
一、研究背景 1
二、研究意义 2
第二节 研究内容与论文框架 3
一、研究内容 3
二、内容框架 4
第三节 本文可能的贡献 5
第二章 概念界定与文献综述 6
第一节 公司治理的界定 6
第二节 股权激励理论分析 7
一、理论基础以及必要性分析 7
二、管理层激励的动机分析 9
三、管理层激励的决定因素 12
四、股权激励对公司股利分配的政策影响 13
五、本节文献评述 14
第三节 现金股利政策 15
一、现金股利理论及其研究进展：非代理理论的回顾 15
二、现金股利政策与公司治理：基于代理理论的分析 20
三、本节文献评述 25
第三章 理论分析与假设提出 27
第一节 股权激励与现金股利政策 27
第二节 股权激励、公司治理与现金股利政策 29
第四章 实证研究设计 32
第一节 样本的选取和数据来源 32
第二节 变量的定义和模型构建 32
一、变量的定义 32
二、模型的构建 34
第五章 实证检验及结果分析 36
第一节 描述性统计 36
第二节 相关性分析 39
一、关于模型一（OPTION） 39
二、关于模型二（YEAR） 39
三、关于模型三（POWER） 40
第三节 多元回归分析 42
一、关于模型三（OPTION） 42
二、关于模型二（YEAR） 43
三、关于模型三（POWER） 43
第四节 稳健性检验 45
第六章 研究结论、建议及展望 46
第一节 研究结论 46
第二节 政策建议 46
第三节 研究局限和展望 47
参考文献 49 |
